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On 29 April 1954, India and China signed an agreement. Under the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954, otherwise known as the Panchsheel, or the "Five Principles" agreement, India gave up all extra-territorial rights and privileges it enjoyed in Tibet, which it inherited from the British colonial legacy, and formally recognized Tibet to be a region of China. The namesake five points agreed were:

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty
2. Mutual non-aggression
3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs
4. Equal and mutual benefit working relationship
5. Peaceful co-existence

By the Sino-Indian agreement, it was recognized that six passes (Shipki La, Mana, Niti, Kungribinri, Darma, and Lipu Lekh) were border passes and "traders and pilgrims of both countries" could travel by them. Immediately thereafter the Chinese Government made an official protest to the Indian Government against the stationing of Indian troops at "Wu-Je" (Barahoti), an area which lies south-east of the Niti pass, describing it as lying "north" of the Niti pass. When informed of the location of the area, the Chinese Government not only refused to correct its embarrassing lack of geographical knowledge, but persisted in claiming the area.

China's success in promoting these principles at the 1955 Bandung Conference helped China emerge from diplomatic isolation. Unfortunately, by the end of the 1950s, however, China's foreign policy stance had become more militant, and the Chinese would later go back on this treaty within three months of its signing. The Indian reaction was somewhat euphoric and exaggerated, and many a MP lauded Nehru's "pacification" of the "Chinese dragon."



J. Nehru and C. En-lai, 1954

The Indian military in general was reserved in its acclamations, and wished resistance of such a treaty, but was overruled by Menon who insisted that Pakistan was the only real enemy. Little attention was paid to the lurking dangers. India and Pakistan had gone to war over Kashmir's accession to India in 1948. Pakistan saw the advantage over India's nonalignment by taking a strong anti-Soviet line, winning the hearts of the West, and the US and the UK in particular. At this time, the Soviet Union had not yet come out very forcefully on India's side. China looked upon the Kashmir question differently. They had indicated, though, that they did not wish to take sides. They also had their claims on territory on the Ladakh district of Jammu and Kashmir. It was wishful thinking on the part of India's leaders to imagine that China would remain indifferent or neutral on this matter. Again, if only the sound appeals of caution by the army were heeded, ignominy would be spared.

During this time, the military was neglected in areas such as the modernization and upgrading of forces. The Kulwant Singh report of 1952 severely castigated the government for neglect and recommended the raising of several divisions of troops and purchase of new equipment. However, apart from raising the Indo-Tibetan Border Force, the other recommendations were shelved, as China was considered a friendly by the government. Thus, the Army was specifically told to concentrate on India's traditional adversary, Pakistan, rather than China, as war with China was viewed as "extremely unlikely."

1955-1960:
This period was marked by increasing tension and clashes on the border between India and China. Yet India failed to evolve and formulate a comprehensive foreign policy vis-à-vis China, and tended to treat them as isolated incidents.



The Ladakh wasteland

 The Aksai Chin Intrusion:
The Chinese, wishing to consolidate their gains in Tibet and the surrounding areas, implemented a plan for developing the infrastructure in those regions. A ring road was constructed which led from China to Tibet and from there via the Karakorum Range to Sinkiang and Mongolia and then back to China. The Indian Ladakh district of Askai Chin region of Jammu and Kashmir state obstructed the construction of this road, and would have forced the Chinese to build through the harsh Takla Makan desert - not the most favorable terrain. Faced with this, the Chinese Government had the choice of building a shortcut through Indian territory inaccessible to India, or build the road in a wasteland of the Takla Makan. The PRC decided on the former. Taking advantage of the historical quirk that they had not actually signed the agreement reached at the Simla Conference, China published maps showing that Aksai Chin belonged to them, and refused the de-facto McMahon line in the East of India, that demarcated the border and control of the land.

In October 1958, the road was discovered, creating a flurry of diplomatic messages by each side, chastising the other for their territorial transgressions. When the public came to know about the Chinese roads, Nehru was faced with increasingly vocal criticism in the Indian Parliament, and he once angrily asked his critics whether they wanted him to go to war on this issue.

Throughout this time, the Chinese claims were unreasonable and often contradictory, bordering incomprehensible. For instance, in 1956, the government-issued "Big Map of the People's Republic of China" showed the eastern border of Ladakh cutting across the middle of Pangong Lake, with Spanggur within India, thus conforming with India's conception of the boundary. A 1947 KMT map showed the same. In a letter of December 17, 1959, Chou En-lai stated that the 1956 map "correctly shows the traditional boundary between the two countries in this sector." Indeed, there should have been no dispute. But, in June 1960, when border talks began, the Chinese Government replaced the 1956 map with a new one that showed the alignment running west of both Pangong and Spanggur lakes.

Before these border incidents, Nehru recommended that the Indian and Chinese governments sift through historical evidence and recommend where the border should be. Chou en-Lai's suggestion, made on November 7, 1959, was the complete demilitarization of the entire border to a depth of 20 km, using the McMahon line in the East and the "line of actual control" in the West. This would effectively have jeopardized India's defensive positions in the East, while legitimizing Peking's land grab in the West. Essentially, China wanted a solution based on military and strategic positions, while India wanted only a strict adherence to boundaries that had been agreed upon for between forty and two hundred years. As with the Kashmir dispute, India reacted to the border conflict as a matter of legality, rather than strategic "semantic slipperiness." Nehru's counter-proposal, was that, in Ladakh, the Indian troops were to withdraw behind the border claimed by China, while the Chinese troops were to withdraw behind the border claimed by India, leaving the territory in between a "no man's land" pending a negotiated settlement. He pointed out that in the east there were no Chinese south of the McMahon line save at Longju, which the Indian government could not permit the Chinese to continue to occupy.













Chinese PLA soldiers in Tibet

Nehru also remarked that his proposal for Ladakh had only one defect, which was that he was unable to ascertain exactly where the Chinese thought the border was, given the rapidly changing Chinese maps. Chou responded in a letter of December 17, 1959, claiming that the proposal was "unfair" to China. He was forced by Nehru's letter into taking a stand on the Chinese border claim: he stated that the 1956 Chinese map, mentioned earlier, correctly showed the "traditional boundary" in Ladakh.

Tensions increased further at India's welcoming of the Dalai Lama, who, in March 1959, when the Dalai Lama with 20,000 followers crossed into India where he was received with great pomp and warmth. Mao felt he had lost face at this, and felt that China "needed a victory in some sphere." The Chinese claim of NEFA was thus voiced in the aftermath of the 1959 Tibetan revolt.

The Khenzemane Incident:
In 1959, in a meeting between Nehru and China's foreign minister, Chou En-Lai, both countries agreed not to send patrols within two miles of the McMahon Line in NEFA. However, On August 7, 1959, about 200 Chinese troops intruded into the Indian border at Khenzemane in the Kameng frontier division at east of Thagla Ridge. When challenged by the Indian patrol and asked to withdraw, they pushed the Indian party consisting of 10 men to the bridge at Drokung Samba. China considered the sector as within Chinese territory, and stated that the international border ran through the Drokung Samba bridge.

PLA soldiers on the Front


The Longju Incident:
On 25th August 1959, around 300 Chinese troops crossed into the Longju region of the Subashin Frontier division and opened fire at the Indian post there. The post was completely surrounded and was captured, but the Indian garrison was later released. In both cases the Chinese heavily outnumbered the Indians. The Indian posts were isolated and solely dependent on air supply. They were typically manned by 12-15 men and with no chances of reinforcements, since there were no access roads leading to it. This was a good reminder of things to come, unfortunately all that transpired were a few protest notes from the Ministry of External Affairs.

By late 1959, Chinese excursions into Indian Territory were getting more and more frequent, and as a result the Army was finally given control of the Indian border in NEFA. The 4th Indian Division was ordered into Assam, from Punjab. It was tasked with the defense of the entire McMahon line from the Bhutan tri-junction to the Burma border. Unfortunately, it was task that it was ill prepared and equipped to handle.

India's plans of peaceful settlement were momentarily shattered by these acts of aggression. India again seized on an opportunity to settle when Chou En-lai visited Delhi in April 1960. Nehru was advised by the Indian remnants of the joint-expert group that India had a "cast-iron case" that the border should be legally demarcated at Kuen-Lun range further east and not the Karakoram range further west, as the Chinese held. They informed Nehru that the Kuen-Lun was also far better from the defense angle, and that India and China should nullify the British MacDonnel proposal of 1899, which had suggested the border along a line from Daulat Beg Oldi near the Karakoram Pass in the north to Lanak La Pass in the south, in mutual settlement. The crux of the evidence was the fact that the Maharaja of Kashmir in the 1840's had actually sent tax collectors on at least two occasions to Aksai Chin, whereas there was no evidence that China had ever attempted to establish an administrative presence at all.

Nehru was anxious to reach such a settlement, but his advisors convinced him against it. A compromise along this line would perhaps have been possible in 1960, and may still be a way out from the impending crisis. Chou En-lai, however, wanted to reopen the whole 2,000 mile-long border. He had earlier indicated that China would agree to India's claim in the northeastern sector, but went back on this when the Indian side would not agree to the Chinese claim-line in Ladakh.

An opportunity to settle the problem was thus lost. While unconfirmed rumors flew, not without some credibility, in the Indian press that the Chinese were training Maoist guerrillas in India's Northeast, Chou left for Nepal and made an anti-India statement there, inflaming passions on both sides, which made the situation even more tense. Each side tried to extend its actual line of control, and the border question became a matter of prestige and test of strength for each.

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