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1. In Ladakh sector, in the IA would patrol as far forward as possible from the present Indian position towards the international border. Posts would be established on the border of Indian territory in an attempt to prevent further Chinese excursions.

2. The same would also apply to areas in Uttar Pradesh on the Indo-China border where posts would be established as far as possible in Indian territory.

The Ministry of External Affairs and the Intelligence Bureau had reasoned that this Indian activity would not elicit a major reaction from the Chinese. As it unfortunately turned out, this assessment would prove to be incorrect. In addition to this fundamental misconception the Indian Army, as will be detailed later, was not geared up for the above task to establish posts in a forward area that it could not support logistically or tactically. Gen. Thapar pointed out that the Chinese could never be matched in numbers and resources in the region since they had a well developed network for re-supply and reinforcement whereas India had a relatively underdeveloped infrastructure. His objections were met with assurances from Nehru and Menon that they did not expect any major escalation. The new orders were transmitted to the Eastern and Western commands on 5 December 1961. The whole exercise was given the codenamed "Operation ONKAR".

In October 1958, Lt. General S.P.P. Thorat, General Officer Commanding, Eastern Command had laid out a detailed paper regarding the defense of NEFA. He had realized that mere patrolling or establishing posts could never defend the McMahon line. Instead, he proposed a front line of forward posts on the border that was supported by two layers of military strongholds. The forward posts were to act merely as early warning beacons and symbols of territorial possession, and were not to be regarded as defended positions. The second line consisted of more strongly defended posts designed to slow down the advancing Chinese and to increase their logistical layout. The last line would actually stop the Chinese and from their counterattacks would be launched with the help of reinforcements from the plains.

Thus, it is clear that sound tactical thinking existed in the Indian Army but the militarily sound advice was largely ignored by the political leadership for short-term solutions and display of bravado.

State of the Indian Army prior to 1962:
When the IA was ordered into NEFA in closing stages of 1959, it was faced with a deployment without adequate regional roads and infrastructure in this, one of the highest battlefields in the world. Almost all the posts in the forward and even some in the rear were supported by airlifts. Nearly everything had to be air dropped, right down to the daily rations, but due to the severe terrain, it was later estimated that only thirty percent of supplies dropped were recovered.

The rations provided to the troops had a calorific value suited for warfare on the plains rather then the high-calorie diet that is required for mountain warfare. Lentils, which are the staple food of the Indian "Jawan" soldier, could not be cooked at high altitudes. Pressure cookers, though requested were unavailable due to "administrative delays". Oil cookers, essential for keeping warm and cooking, were also in short supply.

Since the troops were widely dispersed without connecting roads, medical facilities were poor. Even the helicopters used for airlifts, recently purchased from Russia, were inadequate for high-altitude operations, and there was a marked shortage of spare parts. Winter clothing, and sometimes even basic clothing, was unavailable. New recruits rarely had the full list of items that were supposed to be issued to them. The army had no means of carrying heavy loads in the mountains and hence its mobility and firepower was severely reduced. Its main means of transport in the era of jets were mules and human porters.

The state of weapons and the training of the "jawans" (soldiers) were inadequate for the terrain they were on and the foes they faced. Almost all the equipment and weapons were of 1950s vintage. For instance, the standard infantry rifle issued was the Lee Enfield .303, dating back to W.W.II. Also, when the 4th Indian Division was deployed, it was not trained nor acclimatized for high altitude warfare. Most of its heavy equipment had to be left in the plains because of the lack of transportation. Thus they had precious little firepower they could call on if need be.

Think tanks at the time were at a general consensus that, to counter the Chinese threat, India should do three things:

1. Increase the number of, infrastructure supporting and supplies given to troops,
2. Station of sufficient mobile armored troops at strategic points on the plain to check any potential Chinese advance, whilst keeping an eye on Pakistan.
3. Train and arm sufficient numbers of Tibetan and other ethnic guerrilla groups to tie down significant numbers of Chinese troops behind the front lines, hampering transfer of troop, communication, and materiel. It was said that "the principal problem seems to be lack of interest on the part of the present Indian Government" to enact these suggestions.

The combination of ill-supply, ill-preparedness, numerical and technological inferiority and the heavy-handed decisions taken by a government with little care for ground realities of the impending conflict coalesced to certain the failure of the Indian Army against the Chinese. The training and professionalism of the Indian Jawan could not make up for the tremendous odds stacked against them.

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