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| The establishment of posts in the
forward areas without adequate military support had
created a situation that was ripe for a military
disaster. On 8 September 1962, Brig. Dalvi, Commander,
7th Brigade received a message from his adjutant that
around 8 am, about 600 Chinese soldiers had crossed
Thagla Ridge and had surrounded the Dhola post. The post
commander had requested immediate reinforcements. The
Chinese had chosen the spot and the timing well: Thagla
Ridge, which overlooked the key Chinese garrison at Leh,
was an exceedingly remote area with terrain that was not
conducive for troop movement. In addition, it was a
Saturday and it would take a long time for the
information to reach Delhi along the chain of command.
India's chain of command was further drawn out and
complicated by Nehru's attendance of the Commonwealth
Prime Ministers' Conference in London. Nehru immediately flew back to India and was asked about his reaction. His cautious reply was, "Our instructions are to free our territory. I cannot fix a date; that is entirely for the Army to decide." It was magnified and reported by some members of the press into, "We shall throw the Chinese out." This misquoting is one of the biggest misconceptions that many hold about the '62 war. |
|
Meanwhile, a conference was held with GoC, 4th Division Gen. Niranjan Prasad presiding and it was decided that:
1. The Dhola post
commander would be ordered to stay put, without withdrawal. The
Assam Rifles wing at Lumla, which was two days march away, would
be ordered to establish contact with Dhola.
2. The detachments of 9 Punjab at Shakti and Lumpu would move to
Dhola while the ones at Towang would move to Lumpu. Dalvi knew
that Towang, along with Tsangdhar and Hathungla, were vital
positions that had to be defended at all costs. Any diversion of
9 Punjab to Dhola would leave Towang defenseless.
There were no plans to cater for a major clash at Towang if one should occur. Also, the route from Towang to Thagla was fit only for man pack columns, making troop movement difficult. A sound move would have been to abandon Thagla Ridge and concentrate on defending Towang. However, under political pressure from Brigadier General Staff at XXXIII Corps HQ, 9 Punjab was ordered to depart for Lumpu. Thus began Operation Leghorn with the limited aim of persuading the Chinese to leave Indian territory. The haphazard manner in which 9 Punjab was dispatched exposed the sad fact that Army HQ had no strategic plan in place to deal with a major Chinese response to the Forward Posts policy. Had Nehru not specifically ordered the military to not construct responses to this scenario, again, disaster may have been averted.
|
On 12th September, a meeting was held between Gen. L. P. Sen (Commander, Eastern theater), Gen. Umrao Singh and Gen. Niranjan Prasad. at Tezpur. Gen. Sen reiterated New Delhi's decision to "expel" the Chinese from Indian territory. Unfortunately, this was far removed from the ground situation. Gen. Umrao Singh correctly pointed out that the Chinese could quickly build up to Divisional strength and easily outbid any Indian reinforcements in the Thagla area. Furthermore, all Indian supply trips to areas around Dhola would have to be by airdrops, while the Chinese roadhead was a few miles behind Thagla Ridge. Umrao Singh suggested that Dhola post should be withdrawn 3 miles to the south to the original map marked boundary, and that, moreover, sending 7 Brigade to Thagla would expose Towang and make defense of Nagaland and Manipur more onerous. Unfortunately, Army HQ ignored this sound military advice, due to political, rather than strategic, pressure. This would contribute to the tragic events leading it the defeat of 26th October - purely due to political expediency of pandering Indian security for long-winded, and, in retrospect, empty, Chinese claims of good faith. |
The Chinese resorted to their previous methods adopted in Longju and Khenzemane. The Namka Chu, a fast moving riverlet with 4 bridges crossing it, had now become the de-facto military boundary, and later, the front. All 9 Punjab could do at this point was to dig in opposite the Chinese to prevent further incursion into Indian territory. 9 Punjab was pinned down opposite to Chinese posts and could not mount an attack due to the Chinese being on higher ground with clear lines of fire. In addition, any attack by 9 Punjab without proper bridging equipment, which they did not have, would have been suicidal due to constant Chinese monitoring.
9 Punjab finally managed to reach Dhola on the morning of 15th September and found Chinese troops on both sides of the Namka Chu river. The Chinese had control of the whole of the Thagla Ridge area, and when challenged, demanded that the Indians withdraw as the PRC decided to demarcate it "sacred Chinese land." The Chinese troops met were not mere Frontier guards, as was expected, but well armed troops with automatic weapons - the warmaking divisions of the PRC. On 17th September, COAS HQ ordered 9 Punjab to "capture" Thagla Ridge. Brigadier Dalvi, the only senior commander in the area, refused to execute the order given the ground situation and asked for it to be countermanded. Meanwhile, in New Delhi the public was being assured that "the Army has been told to drive away the Chinese from our territory in NEFA", a task to which the IA was in no position to do. Dalvi realized that the Dhola had become militarily indefensible, as well as Hathungla and Karpola, given the current troop strengths, and advised HQ to abandon the posts. However, by now, Dhola had become a prestige issue with the political leadership and the army was ordered to retain the post. |
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On 20th September, a Chinese sentry near Bridge II on Namka Chu threw a grenade on the Indian position whereupon both sides opened fire. In the resultant shoot-out, 4 Chinese sentries were killed while there were 5 Indian casualties. The situation thus had escalated to a full-fledged shooting match. Meanwhile Eastern Command HQ and XXIII Corps finally managed to supply reinforcements and shore up 7 Brigade by rushing 1/9 Gorkhas and 2 Rajputs by 26th September. Stocking of supplies for 9 Punjab and the other regiments began belatedly but efforts were hampered due to severe lack of available portage. On the on the opening day of the war, October 20, 1962, 513 soldiers, 282 Jawans and officers died.
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