Lt. Gen. B. M. Kaul arrived in Tezpur on 4
October to take over the NEFA operations. He moved to Lumpu on
the 5th, and, on learning that 2 battalions of 7 Brigade were
still there, ordered 1/9 Gorkha and 2 Rajput to move onto
Tsangdhar. Both battalions were under strength and did not have
the requisite supplies or portage. The troops moved out in cotton
uniforms with fifty rounds and light weapons leaving other
equipment behind for heights of 14,500 and 16,000 feet. Deaths
resulted due to lack of acclimatization. In spite of operational
difficulties, Kaul still planned on the 10 October date laid down
by Sen to complete Operation Leghorn. Kaul planned to place a
battalion on Thagla Ridge itself across the Namka Chu river. The
task was to be undertaken by 2 Rajputs. When it was pointed out
that they had absolutely no artillery cover and summer clothing
for 16000 feet, Kaul replied that "determined infantry do
not need artillery" and that 6,000 sets of clothing would be
arriving "soon" via airdrop. Meanwhile at Tsangdhar,
the place scheduled for airdrop, the bulk of the airdrops was
getting lost due to supplies landing in inaccessible places.
There were only 3 days rations available to 1/9 Gorkhas and 2
Rajputs with both battalions spending the nights in summer
clothing and one blanket per man.
|
Finally it was decided to send a patrol
rather than commit a whole battalion. The patrol of 9
Punjab under Major Chaudhary consisted of 50 men. It
reached Tseng Jong on the 9th of October. At 5 am of
October 10th, about 800 Chinese troops supported by heavy
mortars attacked 9 Punjab. The Punjabis were outnumbered,
yet fought gallantly and repulsed the first Chinese
assault inflicting heavy casualties. The Punjabis had 6
dead and 11 wounded and asked Brig. Dalvi permission to
withdraw. Dalvi requested Kaul to hold further
implementation of Leghorn in abeyance in view of the
gravity of the situation. Inexplicably, Kaul replied that
he had no authority to pull back from Thagla and decided
to go to Delhi to talk with The PM Nehru.
|
The battle at Tseng Jong was now raging
furiously. Major Chaudhary was wounded and made an appeal for
mortar and machine gun fire to extricate his force. Brig. Dalvi,
who was watching the battle, made the decision not to open up
with his mortars and machine guns: Firstly, Tseng Jong was beyond
his range of weapons. Secondly, it would have ignited the entire
12-mile front in an all-out battle. The Rajputs and Gorkhas who
had been advancing to Tseng Jong as ordered earlier would have
been mowed down by the Chinese machine guns across the Namka Chu.
Moreover, Dalvi could not have sustained a firefight for long: he
had two 3-inch mortars with 60 rounds each and 2 machine guns
with 12000 rounds. That would have barely sufficed for half an
hour. In addition, Lt. Gen. Kaul was moving to Delhi via a route
that was parallel to the Chinese positions along the Namka Chu.
An all out attack by the Chinese who were in division strength
would have jeopardized Kaul's chances of reaching Delhi. Dalvi,
then gave the Punjabis the order to fall back to Bridge IV.
Virtually
defenseless, and committed against fully supported, fully
entrenched, and a fully outnumbering enemy, the Indians fought
most valiantly, inflicting heavy casualties on the attackers.
Surprisingly, the Chinese allowed the casualties to reach Indian
lines. Some time later, the Chinese were found burying the Indian
dead with full military honors, a testament to the
professionalism of both sides. And due to political ineptness, a
defenseless India found herself at the defending side of an
incresingly hostile conflict.
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