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Kaul reached Delhi on 11th October and immediately met the Prime Minister to apprise him of the latest developments at Thagla. According to Kaul, he explained at the conference attended by the Defense Minister, Finance Minister and the three chiefs about the tactical unsoundness of the Indian position. Yet he offered 3 choices at the meeting:
a. Launch an attack despite the overwhelming Chinese superiority.
b. Cancel the orders of attack and hold on to present positions.
c. Withdraw to a more advantageous position.
Gen. Sen opined that 7 Brigade would hold against the Chinese and recommended that it remain in the current position. He was backed by Thapar and Kaul on this.
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Meanwhile at Thagla, 7 Brigade was reinforced by 4 Grenadiers, who had arrived from Delhi only a few weeks prior and were in summer clothing with three days rations and fifty rounds of ammunition per rifle, bringing the total to 2,500 men. By 16th October they were further reinforced by 450 Border Roads Pioneers assist in carrying loads and collecting airdrops. Interestingly, 7 Brigade which normally could defend a linear defense of 300 yards was now tasked by Army HQ to defend 12000 yards without artillery cover to break up enemy attacks. Efforts were made to build up 7 Brigade in this regard by increasing the tempo of airdrops between 15th and 19th October. Paradoxically, as the tempo of airdrops increased, the amount actually collected decreased. Between 17th and 19th October the Chinese were seen steadily building up using their 7-ton road at Marmang. On 18th October, the Chinese marking parties were seen moving to forming-up places for a night advance and a dawn attack. Frantic messages were sent by & Brigade to Army HQ in this regard, but no decision was taken. |
Predictably, on the morning of
20th October, the Chinese attacked with an artillery bombardment
of 76 mm and 120 mm mortars at the Indian positions of Bridge III
and Bridge IV. Massive infantry assaults followed in divisional
strength. The Rajput and Gorkha positions in Dhola area were
attacked with 2 brigades. One brigade advanced on Tsangdhar.
Other columns were sent to Hathungla to prevent Indian forces
from retreating via Bridges I and II while others threatened the
divisional HQ at Ziminthaung. The Rajputs and Gorkhas were
completely encircled and cut off from each other. They held on
for over three hours despite lack of artillery support and
reinforcements. Many platoons were to fight till the last man
against overwhelming odds.
Major B. K. Pant, commander 2 Rajputs, was a fine example in
courage displayed by the Indian soldier in the battle. His
company held fast against three waves of Chinese assaults and had
suffered heavy casualties. Pant himself was wounded in the
stomach and legs. Yet he continued to lead and inspire his men,
exhorting them to fight till the end to the last man. The Chinese
sensing that their obstacle in taking 2 Rajputs lay with Major
Pant, brought a volley of machine gun fire on his position
killing him instantly. His last words were "Men of the
Rajput Regiment, you were born to die for your country. God has
selected this small river for which you must die. Stand up and
fight like true Rajputs." He died proudly shouting the
Rajput battle-cry: "Bajrang Bali ki Jai."
By 9 am, the Chinese had completely wiped out the two regiments of the Rajputs and the Gorkhas. 2 Rajputs alone had 282 killed, 81 wounded and captured and 90 unwounded and captured out of their total strength of 513. Brig. Dalvi, finding that 7 Brigade was being run over by the Chinese, tried to lead a small retreating party of Indian troops back to Indian lines but was taken prisoner at Dhola. As expected, the Indian posts at Tsangle were eliminated giving the Chinese control over the western end of NEFA. At the eastern edge of NEFA, fighting commenced near the Indian strongpoint of Walong. Also on 20 October, the Chinese attacked the forward posts in Ladakh. The Galwan post fell within a few weeks as did other Chinese targets.
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