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When news of the events of 20 October reached New Delhi, the reaction was of shock, surprise and a sense of betrayal. Pandit Nehru felt that China had betrayed India and had forced an unwanted war on India instead of peaceful co-existence as espoused in Panchasheel. After the Namkachu debacle, Indian Army HQ tried to find reinforcements for dispatch to the NEFA front. It was clear that the threat from a grumbling Pakistan precluded large-scale transfers of divisions from the western border. Hence new divisions in NEFA were raised by pulling out battalions from all over the rest of India.
A strategic plan for NEFA was developed by Army HQ. It focused on the two great ridges in NEFA; one some distance behind the other. Se La, the key feature on the first ridge was to be vital ground backed up by another large garrison at Bomdilla on the second ridge, about 60 miles away. These two strongpoints would be built up to the requisite strength by stocking it up for a siege lasting 15-20 days. Even If the road between Se La and Bomdilla had to be abandoned to the Chinese, air drops would take over for both perimeters. It was also reasoned that the Chinese would be unable to sustain a siege for long due to their stretched lines of communications while the Indians would be supplied from the plains easily, and would have artillery and other heavy weapons at their disposal. This box or fortress defense strategy appealed to Lt. Gen. Harbaksh Singh who was Lt. Gen. Kaul's replacement, due to the latter falling ill at that time. It must be noted that the Thorat-Sen plan detailed earlier called for concentrating at Bomdilla. Militarily, concentrating at Bomdilla would have made sense, however, this idea was rejected as it would require handing over more territory to the Chinese. The government, in a political face-saving gesture, overlooked a fundamental rule of war, that the exchange of territory is acceptable to form a more strategic position whence victory can be achieved from potential defeat.
On 28th October, Kaul reassumed command of IV Corps from Harbaksh Singh. Immediately on assuming command Kaul visited Se La and Bomdilla. The Harbaksh Singh- Palit plan of building up Se La and Bomdilla was progressing well. Se La, under 62 Brigade, was manned by five battalions. Sixty miles down the road, Bomdilla was held by 48 Brigade with 3 battalions. Total strength in the area was around 10-12,000 men. In-between the two was Dirang Dzong, the administrative center. However, Kaul made some fundamental changes to the Harbaksh-Palit plan which would prove to be the final undoing of the Indian Army in NEFA. Kaul allowed the newly appointed GOC 4 Division Maj. Gen. A. S. Pathania to set up his HQ at Dirang Dzong rather than at Se La or Bomdilla. This resulted in only one brigade to defend Se La rather than the two envisaged in the Harbaksh-Palit plan. Se La, Bomdilla and Dirang Dzong could now no longer hold out independently of support by road. A great deal depended on keeping the 60-mile stretch between Se La and Bomdilla open.
Indian Gorkha soldiers, 1962. Notice the trademark Kukri knives |
On 16th November, the Chinese launched probing attacks on the northwest and northeast approaches at Se La. 62 Brigade at Se La put up a stiff resistance, however Pathania ordered them to fall back to Dirang Dzong. Hoshiar Singh, the commander of Se La wanted to hold out at Se La, however under orders a battalion was pulled back from a key prepared position on the Se La perimeter. It was told to occupy a point just behind and below the Se La pass to protect the retreat route. The sight of troops falling back demoralized the Se La defenders. Also, the Chinese who by then had encircled Se La moved into the vacated prepared positions and opened fire. Fighting became heavy and there was vicious hand-to-hand combat. As dawn broke, 62 Brigade was in full retreat from Se La. Again, the Indians inflicted heavy casualties on the superior enemy, giving approximately five times more than was received. |
The question that now remained was whether to make a stand at Direng Dzong or at Bomdilla. Again, Kaul made a critical mistake: instead of specifying instructions to Pathania on the course of action (since Lt. Gen. Kaul was directing the theater operations), he left this important decision at Pathania's discretion. Pathania opted for something else: 65 Brigade at Dirang Dzong was ordered to head for the Assam plains and not Bomdilla. Although the Chinese had opened light arms fire on Dirang Dzong HQ, only small enemy parties had reached its vicinity. Pathania had 3000 men of 65 Brigade under his command and could have put up a fight if he wanted. Yet he ordered a withdrawal from Dirang Dzong. In addition, a column of 65 Brigade with tanks, infantry and support troops left for Bomdilla, however it disintegrated on being ambushed by the Chinese on the road stretch. Bomdilla now remained the last Indian stronghold in NEFA. It was held by 48 Brigade under the command of Brig. Gurbaksh Singh. It would have proved to be a major obstacle for the Chinese, had it not been for Lt. Gen. Kaul who ordered several companies from Bomdilla to be moved out for road clearing operations.
On 18th November when the Chinese attacked, Bomdilla had only 6 companies in place of the intended 12. On the morning of 18th Nov., 48 Brigade was repulsing a Chinese attack in their prepared positions when Kaul phoned Gurbaksh Singh and asked for a column to be sent towards Direng Dzong. Gurbaksh Singh protested since that would mean pulling out troops form his defences and opening Bomdilla to the Chinese. Interestingly, at that time Pathania had already abandoned Direng Dzong and a relief column from Bomdilla would have served little purpose. Yet Kaul was insistent. Accordingly, at 11:15 am. two infantry companies, two of 48 Brigade's four tanks, two mountain guns were rounded up for Direng Dzong. No sooner had the column left Bomdilla, it was promptly ambushed by the Chinese hidden in the nearby wooded slopes. The Indian troops tried returning to their original positions, but these were already held by the Chinese. A full scale attack on the Bomdilla perimeter was now in progress.
After several hours of fighting, the Chinese managed to capture Indian bunkers in both forward and rear areas of the perimeter and pressurized one flank. Seeing that no reinforcements were forthcoming from the plains, Gurbaksh Singh at 4 p.m. decided to order a withdrawal from Bomdilla. He intended to regroup and fight at Rupa, 8 miles to the south. However, 48 Brigade's withdrawal was slow. Meanwhile, the requested reinforcements arrived at Bomdilla at 6:30 p.m. They were never told to the contrary even though Gurbaksh Singh had abandoned Bomdilla. Gurbaksh Singh again thought of defending Bomdilla, but by then the Chinese had cut his lines of communications. On November 19, 1962, Bomdilla fell at 3 am. The planned defence at Rupa never materialized and the remnants of 48 Brigade finally dissolved at Chaku, a position further south of Rupa on 20th November. All resistance by 4 Division had now ended.
The Chinese assault into had extended their line of communication and supplies much too far. Being unable to maintain it, they made a virtue of necessity and declared a unilateral cease-fire on October 24, 1962. While not withdrawing claim, they withdrew occupation to the pre-war boundaries north of the McMahon Line in the eastern sector, but kept a Switzerland-sized area 38,000 Sq. Km of seized territory up to their Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh district. Further, Pakistan illegally gifted China with a 2,600 Sq. Km tribute of Jammu and Kashmir territory in 1963. The People's Republic of China also does not recognize the merger, initiated by Sikkimese popular vote, of Sikkim state and India.
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